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Key Points
•	 Recent years have seen a dramatic growth in the sale of a variety of illicit substances 
on Dark Net drug markets, with on line sales projected to increase exponentially due to 
expanding internet availability, evolving technologies and the profusion of social media. 
•	 This new form of retail market poses a major challenge to not only law enforcement 
agencies but also the UN international drug control system and related legal structures 
within which these agencies operate. 
•	 For vendors and purchasers who use the sophisticated, user friendly and increasingly 
secure Dark Net sites, hidden markets present a safer environment for drug transactions 
and they reduce the multiple risks (coercion, violence, arrest, exposure to other drugs) 
associated with ‘street’ sales.
•	 Research demonstrates that anonymised user forums and online chat rooms encourage and 
facilitate information sharing about drug purchases and drug effects, representing a novel 
form of harm reduction for drug users and an entry point for drug support services. 
•	 Experience to date shows that enforcement efforts through surveillance, hacking and 
other forms of interdiction may be successful in closing down a particular site, but at the 
cost of proliferating hidden drug markets and incentivising technological innovation.
•	 Given an acknowledged lack of technical capacity, legal constraints and poor international 
enforcement coordination, Dark Net interdiction efforts should prioritise high-end crimes 
such as child sexual exploitation, cyber terrorism and weapons trafficking, and work with 
self-regulating, ‘ethical’ drug sites to enhance understanding of high-level criminality on 
the Dark Net. 
•	 The 2016 UN General Assembly Session (UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem is a timely 
opportunity to discuss reform of the UN drug control treaty system to better deal with the 
challenges of the increasingly complex illicit drug market in the twenty-first century.  
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2INTRODUCTION
This policy brief examines the expansion of 
drug markets on the Dark Net or ‘hidden web’ 
and the challenges they pose for both law 
enforcement agencies and the international 
legal framework within which those agencies 
ultimately operate.  The Dark Net drug markets 
are one manifestation of an increasingly 
complex, transnationalised and lucrative trade 
that the extant United Nations drug control 
system, and the treaties upon which it is based, 
is poorly positioned to address. The 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the bedrock of 
the international drug control architecture, 
does much to lock the international community 
into arcane and bureaucratic counter-narcotic 
responses oriented toward criminalisation 
and law enforcement. However, evidence has 
demonstrated that this approach has failed to 
achieve a significant or sustainable reduction 
in drug supply or demand.1 Conceived before 
the challenges of globalisation, transnational 
organised crime, HIV, and the electronic 
communications revolution, the drug treaty 
system and associated ‘traditional’ counter 
narcotics strategies are increasingly inadequate 
tools with which to address emerging challenges 
such as the Dark Net drug markets. 
Within this context, this brief discusses the 
limitations of traditional law enforcement 
strategies in matching, let alone exceeding 
the sophistication and innovation of the 
hidden web and digital crypto-currencies 
used for payment on the Dark Net drug 
markets.  Enforcement responses risk 
exacerbating rather than addressing the 
‘problem’. Efforts to intercept, disrupt and 
contain the hidden markets - as with all facets 
of drug trade interdiction – will likely serve 
only to diversify and professionalise these 
illicit interactions. The key recommendation 
of this brief is that rather than looking to 
improve enforcement capabilities such as 
interception and electronic surveillance, 
(and in a manner that increasingly encroaches 
on civil liberties), official responses should 
give primacy to understanding how ‘ethical’ 
hidden web drug markets that are regulated 
by their user communities and market forces 
might reduce the harms and violence of the 
‘traditional’ drug trade and networks. This 
harm reduction approach would enable scarce 
cyber-crime resources to be dedicated to 
high-end abuse of the Dark Net, such as child 
sexual exploitation; networks for weapons 
trafficking, financial hacking and identity 
theft; and cyber-terrorism.2 
Given projected growth of internet use beyond 
the current 2.8 billion, the sophistication and 
ease of encryption applications, and growing 
specialisation in online retail and distribution 
chains, the emergence and expansion of hidden 
drug markets reinforce the argument that 
dramatic change is required in the way drug 
control is conceptualised and enforced, and 
the importance of pragmatic, evidence based 
responses.  As the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) 2014 World Drug 
Report sets out in its first ever mention of 
the phenomenon, the hidden Dark Net drugs 
markets have ‘the potential to become a popular 
mode of trafficking in controlled substances in 
years to come.’3 This necessitates radical and 
nuanced new approaches that minimise harm.4 
The hidden drug markets, like so many facets 
of today’s smart, modern drug trade cannot be 
addressed through approaches devised half a 
century ago.  Here we suggest that the United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session 
(UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem in 2016 
is an ideal opportunity to engage in serious 
discussion about re-visiting aspects of the treaty 
framework and, particularly within the context 
of the Dark Net, making it more appropriate to 
the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Note on Structure and Methodology
This brief begins with a background to 
e-commerce drug transactions and the 
emergence of the Dark Net in order to situate 
readers unfamiliar with the history, language 
and technology of the hidden markets. It 
then examines the growth of these markets 
and the nature and impact of enforcement 
3responses before developing some concluding 
recommendations that look beyond the standard 
narrative of improvements to policing. The 
brief is based on primary and secondary source 
information and literatures. It incorporates 
interviews with Mike Power, author of Drugs 
2.0, Dr Alexia Maddox of Deakin University 
and Curtin University, Australia and Dr Mark 
Houghton of Leeds University. Online interviews 
were conducted via a direct message facility 
with a sample of users of the Tor network. 
Discussion threads were posted on sites to 
allow anonymous online posting and interviews. 
THE EMERGENCE OF ONLINE DRUG 
TRANSACTIONS
As outlined by Martin (2014),5 illicit drugs have 
been bought and sold on the internet since it 
was first established. According to Markoff6 
(2005), cited in Martin, the first online 
ecommerce transaction was a 1971 marijuana 
exchange between students at Stanford 
University using the Arpanet accounts at the 
institution’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
and their counterparts at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  This underlines the 
‘dual use’ challenge7 that the advent of the 
internet posed for the IDCR, with unstoppable 
and positive advances in global communications 
creating an enabling environment for illicit 
drug supply and use.   
The expansion of Personal Computer 
ownership and growth of internet access 
revolutionised how people communicated 
and retrieved information in relation to illicit 
drugs in the 1990s, a period of growth and 
expansion of the global drug trade following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ‘chemical 
revolution’ of synthetic drug use8 in Western 
Europe, North America and Australasia, the 
strengthening of cocaine and heroin supply 
from South America and South West Asia, and 
the emergence of Mexico as a geographic hub 
of drug distribution and manufacture. The 
internet provided a new, relatively anonymous 
and decentralised space for the exchange of 
knowledge and experience of drug legislation, 
consumption effects and drug manufacture 
and cultivation, including through chat rooms 
and discussion forums that linked users across 
the world.
The ‘alt’ online newsgroup9 pioneered this 
information sharing. Alt.drug and Alt.drugs.
chemistry (created in 1994) hosted discussions 
including how to grow cannabis, manufacture 
synthetics (particularly MDMA and LSD), and 
where to purchase chemicals, equipment and 
paraphernalia. The online market for drugs 
transactions was initially conducted through 
Private Messaging (PM) facilitated by the 
newsgroup. The Hive, established in 1997 
by Hobart Huson brought integrated market 
operations to the online trade. His Texas 
enterprise Science Alliance, which had an 
estimated annual $4 million turnover supplied 
the chemicals, equipment and instruction 
manuals for synthetic drug manufacture 
discussed on The Hive website. 
Law enforcement was slow to respond to the 
emergence of internet based drug transactions, 
with the media initially playing an investigative 
role as with the exposure of Huson and the Hive 
operations by the 2001 NBC programme Dateline 
in its ‘X Files’ episode.10 According to O’Neil ‘At 
a time when the Internet was a fraction of its 
current size, police seemed either clueless or 
uninterested.’11 This reflects the weakness of 
early warning systems, at both national and 
international levels, including within the UN 
system, to identify and respond to new drug 
market trends.12 However, a key vulnerability of 
these websites was their ease of public access 
over the clear net (enabling law enforcement 
infiltration of user groups), and their use of 
traceable payment systems (Paypal, Pecunix, 
Western Union and cash in the post). These 
weaknesses contributed to the arrest of fifteen 
people connected to the Adam Flowers site,13 
which had processed approximately 5,256 
online orders for controlled substances on the 
clear web valued at approximately $1,041,244 
between January 2007 and October 2009.  
4TOR AND THE DARK NET
The early 2000s saw the emergence 
of cybercrime message forums such as 
ShadowCrew, counterfeitlibrary.com and the 
Russian language carderplanet.com operating 
on the clear web through a message board, 
with members communicating through a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN). Hosted in Hong 
Kong, ShadowCrew (2002) had approximately 
2,500 members across an estimated seven 
countries that traded hacked, stolen and 
forged personal information such as credit 
card details, passports, birth certificates and 
driving licences, as well as hacking tools.14 
Intercepted and closed following joint 
operations by US law enforcement and the 
UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in 
2004, ShadowCrew:   
Box 1: ShadowCrew Message Board
Formed part of what the US Department 
of Justice described as “one of the largest 
illegal online centres for trafficking in 
stolen identity information and documents”. 
The website acted as a criminal e-bazaar 
- in effect an online auction site for the 
underworld. By 2004 the international 
network had trafficked at least 1.7 million 
stolen credit card numbers and caused 
financial losses worth $4.3m (£2.1m)15  
 
Outlining the challenge this type of 
transnational, remotely operated web based 
criminal network posed to traditional law 
enforcement, the head of e-crime at SOCA set 
out that ShadowCrew was distinct from the 
‘old-style “top down” organised crime groups: 
5People have been used for specific skills, 
rather than the usual pyramid structure. With 
one person providing the documents, another 
would buy credit card details, another would 
create identities while another would provide 
the drop address […] “This is done without the 
people ever meeting.”16 (See Box 1).
Driving the growth of hidden markets was 
the release in 2002 of The Onion Router 
(Tor) ‘a technology that bounces internet 
users’ and websites’ traffic through “relays” 
run by thousands of volunteers around the 
world, making it extremely hard for anyone 
to identify the source of the information 
or the location of the user’.17  Developed 
through a partnership between the US Navy 
and the non-profit sector including Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Knight Foundation 
and the Swedish International Development 
Agency (with the majority of funding provided 
by the US Department of Defence and 
State Department), Tor enables secure and 
confidential communication, ‘designed to 
stop people – including government agencies 
and corporations – learning your location or 
tracking your browsing habits’.18 The initial 
idea for an encrypted network was raised in 
1996 at the First Information Hiding Workshop.
Tor provided anonymised web mail access 
through Tor Mail and hosted websites (such 
as the drug marketplaces) through hidden 
service capabilities accessed by downloading 
the Tor software on the open web.19 As 
outlined on the Tor Project page ‘Using 
Tor “rendezvous points,” other Tor users 
can connect to these hidden services, each 
without knowing the other’s network identity 
or physical location’20 (Box 2).
Box 2: The TOR
The goal of Onion Routing is not to 
provide anonymous communication. 
Parties are free to (and usually should) 
identify themselves within a message. 
But the use of a public network 
should not automatically give away 
the identities and locations of the 
communicating parties. For example, 
imagine a researcher who uses the 
World Wide Web to collect data from 
a variety of sources. Although each 
piece of information that he retrieves 
is publicly known, it may be possible 
for an outside observer to determine 
his sensitive interests by studying the 
patterns in his requests. Onion Routing 
makes it very difficult to match his 
HTTP requests to his site.
David. M Goldschlag, Michael G. Reed 
& Paul F. Syverson, ‘Hiding Routing 
Information, Workshop on Information 




Knowledge of the unique URL was previously 
required to locate hidden markets. However 
reflecting rapid advance of Dark Net 
technologies, the Grams search engine 
(discussed at the end of this paper) launched 
in 2014 enables searches across hidden market 
sites on the Tor.21 Modelled on Google (Box 3), 
the advent of Grams brings a normalisation 
of activities on the hidden web, facilitating 
access to illicit markets. 
Again with reference to the dual use dilemma 
facing the international drug control system 
and the wider UN framework of which it is 
a part,  blocking Tor downloads to prevent 
illicit transactions is to the detriment of 
the software’s important and intended 
6role in anonymised communication. News 
organisations, whistle-blowers and social 
activists – for example in Turkey, China and Iran 
use the Tor software to mobilise civil society 
and to publicise serious human rights abuses. 
According to O’Neill (2014), Tor had 40,000 
users in Iran until Iranian authorities, like 
their Chinese counterparts, began to develop 
blocking tools to prevent Tor download:
Tor, an anonymity tool used by millions of 
people around the world for a wide variety 
of purposes, is a powerful and popular tool 
used in Iran by political activists and citizens 
looking to get around the country’s strict 
speech and press laws. 22
Since the US National Security Agency (NSA) 
leaks by Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks release 
of documents by Chelsea Manning, national 
governments and intelligence services have 
stepped up efforts to track communications 
and block Tor download. Nevertheless, Tor 
and hidden services continue to evolve with 
the development of new circumvention tools 
such as unlisted bridges and hidden paths to 
the Tor network. More recently Tor launched 
an .onion address for Facebook users23 in 
response to ongoing privacy issues and to 
assist accessibility to social networks where 
these have been blocked. The end result is 
a technological ‘arms race’ that enables the 
refinement of Tor processes and continued 
expansion of increasingly robust and 
sophisticated Tor services, which as discussed 
below, have become the driver of adaptation 
and growth of online hidden drug markets. 
 
DRUGS AND HIDDEN MARKETS
The first drug market to exist on the Tor 
network was The Drugstore, launched in 2009. 
According to Interviewee A, a former co-
administrator of Drugstore: 
Box 3: Grams website
7The Drugstore was the first .onion drugs 
market that operated on the Tor network. 
Prior to that it was torture to get people to 
be secure! We tried to enforce PGP24 and Tor 
on our forums prior to that but people just 
didn’t listen and busts were rare back then I 
was involved in setting up further .onion sites 
[…] During the onion forum era a huge amount 
of dealing was done via the PM system with 
E-mail only used by vendors who were not part 
of forums.  
The second hidden service drug forum was A 
Figment of Your Imagination (AFOYI) followed 
by Binary Blue Stars (BBS) (See Box 4) ‘a joking 
reference to the old rumour that people 
distributed LSD to kids on blue star stickers.’ 
According to Interviewee A, this forum was 
‘pretty epic’:
We had some huge acid dealers on it, we 
actually had our forum logo put on about a 
thousand sheets of acid that were distributed 
around the world so if you ever saw a sheet 
with two blue stars on it that was representing 
our community!  
Credibility was promoted through the 
allocation of vendors to a specific forum 
depending on the trust and the quality of their 
products: 
Box 4: Building the Early Drug Markets
BBS was the highly trusted forum, 
I think AFOYI was actually the forum we 
allocated for mid-level trusted people 
and then TLG (The Looking Glass) was 
for the least trusted people. Our goal 
was that we would get a lot of people on 
TLG and then if they proved to be legit 
we would promote them to AFOYI, and if 
they were still legit. And there for a long 
time they might make it to BBS if they 
had something to offer.
Interviewee A   
From the trusted members on BBS, the idea 
of a totally public forum developed - the 
Open Vendor Database (OVDB), a move away 
from the existing market model of closed 
forums and privately organised groups. BBS, 
AFOYI and TLG were taken down, with OVDB 
launched around the same time as Silk Road 
1.0. According to Mike Power, significant 
volumes of acid were moved across the OVDB 
with threads from vendors advertising the 
goods that they had to sell. 
In terms of the financial transactions on the 
OVDB, interviewee A explains this began with 
Western Union, Money Gram, cash in mail, 
e-gold and then Liberty Reserve, a Costa Rica-
based centralized digital currency service that 
enabled users to open accounts and transfer 
money with only a name, date of birth and 
email address.25
It was all on trust. You would have to open a 
Liberty Reserve account, put the money into 
the account and then encrypt the user name and 
password using PGP to that account and send 
it to the vendor, and send that via a private 
message system on the forum. The vendor 
would then take that money and cash it out.
As OVDB was launched, discussions emerged on 
its forums about Silk Road, which in addition 
to illegal drugs, sold clothing, art, books, 
music and computer and digital equipment 
(Boxes 5 & 6). When people accessed the site 
they found a professionally designed webpage 
where various categories of products were 
listed along with photographs. 
Vendors had a short description and contact 
details that would normally contain their 
public key for PGP encryption (Box 7). The site 
had forums discussing and explaining the use 
of PGP, guiding new users in data encryption 
and decryption programming used for signing, 
encrypting, and decrypting texts, e-mails and 
other forms of electronic communication. 
8Payment for goods and services on Silk Road 
were made in Bitcoin, an encrypted digital 
currency. In contrast to the vulnerabilities 
exposed by Paypal, Western Union and cash in 
post, this offered anonymity in financial 
transactions. The use of anonymous Tor mail 
for private and anonymised communications 
between site users was another important 
security feature. 
Box 6: Silk Road Site
The screen shot on the adjacent page (Box 
8) shows the rapid increase in the number of 
accounts opened on Silk Road, from 130 in 
February 2011 to 39,421 a year later. 
Box 5: Discussions about Silk Road
I came across this website called Silk Road. 
It’s a Tor hidden service that claims to 
allow you to buy and sell anything online 
anonymously. I’m thinking of buying off 
it, but wanted to see if anyone here had 
heard of it and could recommend it. I found 
it through silkroad420.wordpress.com, 
which, if you have a tor browser, directs you 
to the real site at http://tydgccykixpbu6uz.
onion. Let me know what you think.
Altoid’s thread. January 27 2011, 
shroomery.org 
Box 7: PGP Encryption
The PGP is based on two keys - one public 
and one private. Only the private key is 
known by the individual. The public key 
is published, an individual then copies the 
public key and information is encrypted 
using that key as a receiver of the encrypted 
information. This can then be de-crypted 
using the private key and password.
See the International PGP homepage for 
a detailed description http://www.pgpi.
org/doc/pgpintro/ 
9Box 8: Silk Road Growth
Silk Road challenged the viability of OVDB, 
particularly as Silk Road received significant 
media publicity. A 2011 article ‘The Underground 
Website Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable’ 
by Chen in Gawker, set out that: 
Silk Road, a digital black market that sits 
just below most internet users’ purview, 
does resemble something from a cyberpunk 
novel. Through a combination of anonymity 
technology and a sophisticated user-feedback 
system, Silk Road makes buying and selling 
illegal drugs as easy as buying used electronics—
and seemingly as safe. It’s Amazon—if Amazon 
sold mind-altering chemicals.26
Traffic to the site escalated as a result of 
media articles that introduced readers to the 
Dark Net. There was also positive feedback 
from Silk Road users, one buyer commenting 
that Silk Road 1.0 provided a smoother user 
experience compared to OVDB:
I like their trust system and the karma concept 
they have on the forums, but I haven’t order 
from there as i feel the website is less user 
friendly than SR and so far I have had excellent 
experiences here so I don’t feel i need to risk 
it[…] Having said that, OVDB is a great 2nd 
site. The more the merrier and it spreads the 
LE bulls-eye around […] 
which is good.
 
A few months after Silk 
Road had commenced 
trading, OVDB closed 
with the ex-administrator 
interviewee A reflecting 
that:
It just wasn’t worth it 
for me anymore. DPR 
[Dread Pirate Robert, 
Silk Road founder] had 
a business model and a 
reason to keep running 
his site. SR went from 
a thousand members to 
tens of thousands to a hundred thousand from 
all the media attention and OVDB only had a 
few thousand at its peak. I decided it is better 
for us to just get behind Silk Road, and at the 
same time I figured actually that our entire 
model is not optimal. We should not have drug 
forums, we need a decentralized marketplace 
software that is NOT meant for use for illegal 
activity but is able to be used for ANY sort of 
market based site. 
OVDB vendors, buyers and administrators 
moved over to Silk Road, which created an 
OVDB sub forum to attract tech-savvy users 
and facilitate the exchange of drugs in what 
was projected to become an increasingly 
competitive online marketplace. 
CRYPTO CURRENCY AND BITCOIN
The key advantage of Silk Road 1.0 over 
competitors was the site’s use of Bitcoin 
‘digital coins which are not issued by any 
government, bank, or organization, and rely 
on cryptographic protocols and a distributed 
network of users to mint, store, and 
transfer.’27 Crypto currencies enable direct 
and anonymous transactions without oversight. 
These technologies enable online vendors and 
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buyers to communicate and exchange funds 
anonymously and with little risk of detection. 
According to an interview with Dread Pirate 
Roberts, Silk Road emerged from an   original 
idea to combine Bitcoin and Tor to create an 
anonymous market.28 First devised by Satoshi 
Nakamoto in 2008, Bitcoin was launched in 
2009 via a public post on an exclusive emailing 
list for cryptographers where Satoshi (2009) 
wrote ‘Announcing the first release of Bitcoin, 
a new electronic cash system that uses a peer-
to-peer network to prevent double-spending. 
It’s completely decentralized with no server or 
central authority.’29 For Satoshi the immediate 
problem Bitcoin faced was establishing its 
intrinsic value however as the popularity of Silk 
Road 1.0 grew, Bitcoin became the currency of 
choice within the drug marketplace forging a 
mutually beneficial relationship between the 
site and the crypto-currency, which reached a 
value of $9: 1 Bitcoin by mid-2011. 
HIDDEN MARKETS AND HARM REDUCTION
The media brought Silk Road and hidden 
markets to the attention of politicians. In the 
US, Senator Chuck Schumer called on Federal 
Authorities to take action against Silk Road, 
which he described as ‘a certifiable one stop 
shop for illegal drugs that represents the most 
brazen attempt to peddle drugs online that we 
have ever seen’.30 Schumer expressed dismay 
that users rated the delivery performance of 
vendors and quality of the drugs that they 
bought on the site. While ‘brazen’, these 
activities appear to play an important and 
innovative role in the reduction of drug 
related harm. 
Harm reduction approaches accept ‘for better 
or worse, that licit and illicit drug use is part 
of our world and chooses to work to minimize 
its harmful effects rather than simply ignore or 
condemn them’.31 Harm reduction principles 
acknowledge that some ways of using drugs 
are safer than others and ‘affirms drugs users 
themselves as the primary agents of reducing 
the harms of their drug use.’32 As remote and 
anonymised transactions, hidden drug markets 
reduce the risks associated with illegal drug 
transactions with ‘street dealers’.33 
Harocopos and Hough34 describe two retail 
market transactions; in closed markets, the 
customer is known to the vendor. In open 
markets, customer and vendors are not known 
to each other. The latter has traditionally been 
seen as the more dangerous owing to: lack of 
trust between buyer and seller, the risk to both 
of physical exposure and arrest ‘on the street’, 
vulnerability to entrapment or violence, and 
the risk to the buyer of purchasing from 
strangers. Closed markets modify these risks 
but the buyer (and seller) can never guarantee 
drug type or purity, creating risk of illness and 
overdose. While hidden markets such as Silk 
Road reduce the barriers to purchasing, they 
also ameliorate the other dangers associated 
with open market transactions. According to 
one Silk Road user:    
Before I found online drug markets I bought 
on urges and impulses from local wannabe 
gangsters, I had to call on the phone first to 
make sure things were cool then call to the 
house where I felt uncomfortable.  There was 
sometimes the offer of more than I wanted on 
tick or try this, try that.  I never did try any 
other drug from these wannabes but it was 
always there.
If the buyer is not satisfied with the product 
purchased from street dealers, or the buyer 
suffers complications from taking the drug due 
to other unknown substances in the product 
there is little chance of a refund, resolution or 
alerting other customers to defective, toxic or 
mis-sold drugs: 
The street market is more risky for everyone. I 
would not want to sell from my house or my car 
to people face to face where I can be identified 
by several ways. Not only by police but by 
other rival dealers or gangs. The street market 
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doesn’t have feedback or rating available 
for every buyer to read. You are more likely 
to be involved with people who might not be 
concerned in your welfare.’ (SR Vendor)
According to Aldridge and Décary-Hétu the 
Dark Net drug markets are harm reducing as 
market influence and position are determined 
by technical know-how and not propensity for 
violence. Identifying Silk Road as a ‘paradigm-
shifting criminal innovation’, they set out 
that violence in the traditional ‘street’ drug 
trade ‘was commonly used to gain market 
share, protect turfs and resolve conflicts.’ By 
contrast ‘the virtual location and anonymity 
that the crypto market provides reduces or 
eliminates the need – or even the ability – to 
resort to violence.’  As a result, while we 
must acknowledge that the potential of Dark 
Net drug markets to reduce traditional retail 
market violence is not the same across all 
countries and are currently most active in 
Europe, North America and Australasia - good 
customer service and writing skills ‘may be 
more important than muscles and face-to-
face connections.’35
  
A second harm reduction benefit of the hidden 
markets is the ratings systems pioneered by 
Silk Road. These are an important guide to the 
quality of products, reducing the likelihood of 
contamination, mixing and dilution with other 
products, overdose, and morbidity. As outlined 
by one Silk Road vendor, this is driven on the 
supply side by the prioritisation of market 
growth and related importance of customer 
care and feedback: 
The advantage of Silk Road is your reputation 
is open to all. If you mess someone around its 
reflected in your feedback and ratings. The 
seller who wants good business on Silk Road 
has to try and make every customer happy. 
Customer service has never been this good 
on the street market. The downside as a 
buyer is having to trust the service with their 
money before the goods arrive and disclosing 
your personal details for delivery. The more 
Box 9: Silk Road user comments
“MUCH safer, you know what your getting, 
you can see reviews of the product 
before you buy.” 
“The feedback system is revolutionary 
for a market like this. All my fears 
about quality are gone. I know what I’m 
getting and I know that it’s good.” 
“Security of the transaction, less chance 
of violence, the rating and feedback 
system gives some confidence on the 
quality and substance;” 
“Mostly I buy by vender reputation and 
buyer reports from the forums.” 
experience you have on Silk Road the more 
confident you get.’ (SR vendor)
Chat rooms and discussion forums enable 
information and experience sharing on drug 
safety, optimal dosing and polydrug use that 
reduce the risk of serious harm or illness. They 
create a community of individuals in a non-
judgemental environment where people feel 
safe to discuss drug related issues due to the 
anonymity provided by Tor (Box 9). For Bartlett 
‘Users and sellers alike can have the freedom 
to be open and express themselves in ways 
that are impossible in real life.’36 Silk Road 
users highlight the harm minimising benefits 
of the site:  
The community here is awesome. I mean look 
in the forums, there is a “Drug Safety” forum. 
The whole philosophy behind the place is that if 
you want to put heroin in your body, go ahead. 
But hey, if you want to get off that nasty drug, 
we’re here to help you too. It’s not like real 
life where street dealers might coerce you into 
keeping your addiction or whatever. 
I read the forums [...] I sometimes take a 
chance, and I have never been ripped off or 
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sent fake drugs. That is pretty incredible, 
since online pharmacies usually you will be 
scammed 9 times out of 10, and even the ones 
who are given good reviews are usually sending 
pills that have been repressed with filler 
or illegal substances like heroin. I feel like 
people are less judgemental and pretentious 
here than on other websites.
Some users reported the site as having a 
regulating and moderating effect on their 
drug use:37
I now control my consumption by ordering 
days or weeks (international) in advance and 
have found I smoke less but better quality
The Silk Road is a paradise for responsible 
drug dealers. I mean it’s not the type of site 
where you can show up at your dealer’s house 
banging on their door because you need your 
fix this instant. You have to be patient and you 
have to be smart to get there and use it.  
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In the 2014 World Drug Report, the rise of 
hidden, Dark Net drug markets was belatedly 
acknowledged.  The Report set out that 
the variety of drugs available on the Dark 
Net appeared to be ‘diverse and growing’ 
and this posed ‘unique challenges for law 
enforcement.’38 As outlined by Interpol in 
the September 2014 Internet Organised Crime 
Assessment (iOCTA), the relationship between 
customer and vendor in the hidden markets is 
purely transactional. ‘Criminals in cyberspace 
do not need to be close to the crime scene, 
they might never even travel to the target 
country’, their activities can be conducted 
transnationally and ‘with minimum effort and 
risk by hiding their identity’, the Assessment 
notes. By contrast, in the off-line world 
‘criminals normally need to be physically 
present at the crime scene and can typically 
only commit one offence at a time.’39 
Law enforcement responses to the Dark Net 
have configured around traditional strategies 
of surveillance, interdiction and prosecution, 
although from a low base of technical capacity, 
with limited transnational integration and within 
the constraints imposed by national legislative 
frameworks. In a pattern that is familiar across 
the range of drug supply interdiction activities 
(crop eradication, targeting of so-called cartels, 
interception and seizure along trafficking 
and distribution networks), the effect of 
enforcement activities on the Dark Net has 
been to fragment and diversify drug markets, 
while catalysing innovation in security and 
counter surveillance, as discussed below.
In August 2013 an announcement was posted on 
Hidden Wiki (Box 10) that Freedom Hosting, a 
service inside the Tor network providing privacy 
tools that included TorMail, had been taken 
down by the US FBI and that its owner resident 
in Ireland had been arrested.40 This followed an 
investigation into child sexual exploitation.  
Servers of Freedom Hosting for Tormail, which 
included the entire e-mail database were 
seized, sending shockwaves through the hidden 
web. The FBI obtained a vast trove of e-mail, 
highlighting the importance of robust security 
protocol in hidden market transactions. As one 
Silk Road forum member set out:   
I actually consider this thing a good thing 
because finally it will make people much 
more concerned about their security. I don’t 
really think many people have something to 
really worry about (and I hope I’m right) but 
it’s anyway a good “wake up” for people that 
this is not a joke. I see people here that used 
very obsolete  versions of Tor, people that 
didn’t encrypt their sensible info and trusted 
a third-party site, people that didn’t know the 
difference between having Java Script enabled 
or not, people (and even worse vendors) that 
just used Tor bundle and that’s it thinking 
they are secure just for this. 
It removed the veneer of invincibility […] a 
lot of people using Silk Road got complacent 
(including me, sending unencrypted addresses 
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and such), and therefore stopped using DNMs41 
for a while afterward. If the biggest can go 
down, any can and this hopefully has led to 
increased security for other markets ow. 
 
Arrests following the seizure were widely 
reported in the media, ensuring continued 
high profile coverage of Silk Road and hidden 
markets.42 Two months after Freedom Hosting’s 
closure, the FBI arrested San Francisco based 
Ross William Ulbricht as the alleged Silk Road 
operator Dread Pirate Roberts and seized assets 
of the site (Box 11), primarily 29,000 Bitcoins 
valued at approximately $5 million.43 The FBI 
described Silk Road as ‘the most sophisticated 
and extensive criminal marketplace on the 
Internet’ with a turnover of $1.2 billion and 
generation of $80 million in commissions for 
its administrators.  
With Silk Road down, vendors and buyers 
immediately shared contact email addresses 
and public keys. The effect of closing the site 
was not to prevent the sale or purchase of 
drugs; rather it drove communications further 
underground, while increasing user attention 
and knowledge of security issues.
A second consequence of Silk Road’s 
interdiction was a rise in registration on 
other Dark Net sites such as Black Market 
Reloaded and Sheep Marketplace, which 
provided a mechanism for verifying trusted 
Silk Road vendors in order to encourage their 
customers to follow. Just as the interdiction 
and break-up of Colombia’s Medellin ‘cartel’ 
and assassination of its leader Pablo Escobar 
Box 10: Law Enforcement Responses
Box 11: FBI Notification of Silk Road 
Ta e Down
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had no impact on levels of cocaine supplied 
from Colombia, so closing Silk Road and 
arresting Dread Pirate Roberts had no long 
term or catastrophic impact on the Silk Road 
project or hidden markets more broadly; quite 
the reverse. It stimulated new competition, 
innovation in business models and the 
launch of Silk Road 2.0 as communicated by 
Libertas one of the moderators on Silk Road 
in November 2013: 
I would like to announce our new home
http://silkroad5v7dywlc.onion 
As I have always stated, even with Silk Road 
itself, you should act at all times as though 
any site or marketplace you visit has been 
compromised from the very beginning. That 
is the only way to ensure that you do not 
become lax with your security. Do not fall 
into a false sense of security at any time on 
any site. Do not get comfortable. When you 
get comfortable you get confident, when you 
get confident you get cocky, and when you 
get cocky you get caught. With the necessary 
security warnings out of the way, I look 
forward to seeing you all over on the new site. 
Let LE [Law Enforcement] waste their time 
and resources whilst we make a statement to 
the world that we will not allow jackbooted 
government thugs trample our freedom. We 
are born free, yet moments later we are 
shackled by the rule of law. It is time, once 
again, to break free of those shackles.
Demonstrating a high level of flux and dynamism 
in the illicit marketplace following the closure 
of Silk Road 1.0 in 2013 and the termination 
of its near monopoly on hidden market drug 
transactions, a plethora of new sites emerged. 
Operations in the free market of the Dark Net 
environment were highly competitive, with 
weak ‘firms’ that were incapable of ensuring 
the market premium of robust security quickly 
closed down - as was the case with Sheep 
Marketplace following the theft of £3.3 million 
Bitcoins and also Atlantis in September 2013, 
which posted on its clear web Facebook page:44
We have some terrible news. Regrettably it has 
come time for Atlantis to close its doors. Due 
to security reasons outside of our control we 
have no choice but to cease operation of the 
Atlantis Market marketplace. Believe us when 
we say we wouldn’t be doing this if it weren’t 
100% necessary. Due to the urgency we are 
allowing all users to withdrawal (sic) all their 
coins for one week before the site, and forum, 
are shut down permanently. Please remove all 
of your coins; these will not be recoverable 
after one week from now. Anything remaining 
in your accounts will be donated to a drug 
related charity of our choosing. We wish to 
thank all of you for making Atlantis a great 
and memorable place to trade on. We wish 
you all the best in your future endeavours.
By contrast, the use of third generation 
authentication features and sophisticated 
marketing and advertising campaigns by sites 
and vendors - such as discount offers on bulk 
drug purchases and free samples, enabled new 
market entrants to thrive and consolidate. 
These include Evolution, which by end 2014 
had 17,512 listings and a 28 per cent market 
share of total listings, Agora with 17,200 
listings and a 27.5 per cent market share and 
Silk Road 2.0 with 15,837 listings and a 25.3 
per cent market share. Comprising 81 per cent 
of total listings, these three market places 
contributed to 41 per cent of online Dark 
Net market places between May and October 
2014. According to Mike Power, arrests and the 
closure of Silk Road version:
Has inadvertently been the most brilliant 
advertising for hidden web drug markets. The 
FBI have acted as the most creative marketing 
and advertising agency that the hidden web 
drugs sector could have possibly have hoped for.
According to Alexia Maddox ‘when the volatility 
of the drug market grabbed onto the vendors 
they knew and went underground’, in turn 
complicating the already onerous challenge 
posed by the hidden markets to law enforcement. 
The market places have continued to evolve 
and expand in 2014 as new sites such as Agora, 
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the drug markets and that the much publicised 
impact of this enforcement operation was 
overstated. 
In response to the seizure of Silk Road 1.0 
and now 2.0 new decentralised open source 
markets are emerging such as Dark Market 
and Open Bazaar, which means the code is 
publicly available. According to its developer46 
OpenBazaar  (Box 14) is a new way to trade 
online with Bitcoin users: 
By running a program on your computer, you 
can connect directly to other users in the 
OpenBazaar network and trade with them. 
This network isn’t controlled by a company; it’s 
a decentralized network that isn’t run by any 
organization at all. This means there are no 
mandatory fees to pay, and that your trade is 
censorship-resistant. OpenBazaar uses Bitcoin, 
a digital currency that is also cheap to use, 
decentralized, and censorship-resistant.
Maddox outlines that ‘People are constantly 
looking at different parameters on how they 
can sustain the market places. I do believe 
there are new market place concepts being 
Box 12: Hidden Market Closure 
Notification 2014
Box 13: 2014 Seizures  Source: Digital Citizens Alliance
Evolution and Pandora came on line. At the 
time of writing, Dark Net Stats cite a figure of 
forty-five current live sites.
 
Following a joint operation by the 16-member 
states of Europol, the FBI, US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Homeland 
Security,45 twenty seven hidden market sites 
were closed in November 2014, including 
Silk Road 2.0 (Box 12). However, Box 13 
demonstrates that the transaction volume of 
the closed sites represents less than a third of 
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worked up as we speak that will transform how 
business is done. The markets have adapted 
and will continue to adjust to market driven 
needs for the foreseeable future. Digital 
relationships will form and dissolve depending 
on the emerging risks and opportunities.’
Interdiction of Silk Road, continued demand 
for illicit drugs, advances in online security 
technology and crypto currencies, and the 
scale of profits to be generated from drug 
sales will ensure that the hidden markets 
will continue to adjust to consumer demands. 
Moreover hidden web activities will become 
more accessible through innovations like the 
Grams search engine and normalised through 
the trend of advertising activity and links on 
the clear web. The developer of Grams, which 
receives around 10,000 searches and 6,000 
unique visitors a day, set out that: 
I created grams because 90% of the Dark Net 
was behind black market sites which required 
a login to view. This made it unsearchable by 
normal search engines. The only real way to get 
reliable information about these parts of the 
Dark Net was to read forums and subreddits. I 
wanted to make it easier for users to use the 
Dark Net. Grams has made Dark Net information 
more accessible to normal users and because of 
its publicity has brought a lot of new users to 
the Dark Net.  I think 
it has also raised the 
bar for Dark Net 
sites. Before grams 
a lot of the sites 
we not very well 
designed or easy to 
use. I think Grams 
set a new standard 
for what a Dark Net 
site could be. I like 
to think of the Dark 
Net as the internet 
reborn […] The Dark 
Net can be much 
more. It can be a 
safe haven for people who want change but 
are afraid to speak because of governing laws 
or repercussions to themselves and/or their 
families. I hope Grams can help it grow into 
what it needs to be.47  
This adaptation has transformed how people 
can search the hidden web and access the 
vendors by name without having to log onto 
various sites. It has received favourable 
reviews from reddit users. 
I still use Grams to compare prices and 
vendors without having to log into different 
sites. I love it! 
Grams impresses the hell out of me for all the 
little things he works on to makes markets 
more usable. The engine is truly impressive 
and he really does work toward giving people 
what they want. I believe a lot of vendors 
have at least a few customers who discovered 
them via GS. 
It allows you to find where a certain vendor 
has set up shop if you can’t find them on your 
own, and it gives you access to all the customer 
feedback they have all in one place. It really 
makes things a lot easier when trying to find 
legit vendors for something and for sniffing 
out the bad ones as well.
Box 14: Open Bazaar
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When Silk Road 1.0 was closed, commentators 
predicted a crash in Bitcoin’s value. However, 
just as the Dark Nets bounced back and 
strengthened as a result of law enforcement 
efforts, Bitcoin rebounded rising to $305 
within weeks. Ugo Egbunike, director of 
business development at Index Universe 
stated ‘I thought Silk Road is going to do 
some damage to the price but with BTC China 
buying this up - they seem to have picked 
up the slack.’48 Underlining recognition of 
Bitcoin as a viable and legitimate currency 
and its normalisation outside of Dark Net 
transactions, the German government will 
impose capital gains tax on Bitcoin trading,49 
and the Chief Executive of Visa stated that 
the company was open to facilitating the 
use of Bitcoin.50 The Superintendent of the 
New York Department of Financial Services 
revealed a draft proposal in 2014 of regulations 
governing virtual currencies like Bitcoin. If 
passed, they will be the first regulations on 
virtual currencies anywhere in North America 
to carry the full weight of the law.51 
CONCLUSIONS
Hidden drug markets are projected to 
experience exponential growth influenced 
by multiple dynamics that include expanding 
internet access; the emergence of a new 
tech-savvy generation; the development and 
ease of security tools; the evolution of crypto 
currencies, and – most significantly, sustained 
international demand for illicit drugs. The 
value of the Dark Net drug markets and 
incentives to engage in supply are a factor of 
the illegality of drugs, while criminalisation 
of the trade will continue to drive efforts to 
develop alternative, ‘risk free’  (or reduced 
risk) transaction chains. The internet is 
generating rapid change in the illicit drug 
trade, providing an accessible and efficient 
mechanism for global marketing and sales.52 
These will become more professionalised 
and consumer oriented, underpinned by an 
expanding interface with the clear web and 
social media – as most recently exemplified by 
Facebook’s decision to enable user connections 
directly to the Tor.    
Serious and complex challenges exist in dis-
embedding the (increasingly less) hidden drug 
markets, which evolve from the bottom up 
rather from the top down, respond efficiently 
to market conditions and which lack a 
physical infrastructure, enabling vendors to 
quickly relocate their business in response 
to enforcement pressures.53 As demonstrated 
by the ‘successful’ closure of Silk Road 1.0 
and more recently Silk Road 2.0, surveillance 
and interdiction efforts, including through 
the tracking of crypto currencies and efforts 
to block Tor downloads generates new and 
relentless innovation in technologies and 
encryption.  Even in a hypothetical scenario of 
complete and sustainable hidden drug market 
interdiction and closure, the impact will be 
simply to return drug trading to more harmful 
street markets.       
Traditional law enforcement strategies 
and policing techniques are inadequate to 
confront the full range of Dark Net and hidden 
services available, and that pose challenges 
in terms of locating servers and uncovering 
encrypted, anonymised identities dispersed 
internationally among individuals rather than 
hierarchically organised criminal gangs. As 
outlined by Europol in the 2014 iOCTA report 
‘it appears that EU law enforcement, Europol 
included, has not fully conceptualised how to 
integrate this cyber dimension into all relevant 
aspects of police work, let alone devise a 
strategy and implementation plan to make this 
happen.’ The transnationalised nature of the 
hidden markets render national level policing 
strategies and evidence gathering largely 
ineffectual, while simultaneously posing 
complex questions in relation to prosecution. 
As outlined in an interview with Houghton: 
Have the police got the resources to put into 
policing the online markets? Who is responsible? 
Is it the responsibility of the country where 
the server exists? do they know where the 
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server is? It’s the classic problem of dealing 
with transnational crime, where exactly does 
the offense take place, is it at the point of 
transaction or at the point of possession?
To date, enforcement has relied on the 
use of informants, undercover surveillance, 
tracking, hacking, exploitation or creation 
of security breaches (for example through 
the use of malware) and high publicity ‘take 
downs’ intended to alarm and intimidate users, 
vendors, and host service providers, including 
through the message that no interactions can 
ever be anonymous and always risk arrest and 
prosecution. 
The problem with these approaches, as with 
much anti-drug rhetoric, is that the audience 
can become quickly inured to the articulated 
threat and risk. Moreover in seeking to contain 
and disrupt hidden markets through traditional 
policing techniques and by bending established 
legislation to new challenges, law enforcement 
risks becoming increasingly reckless in its 
violations of civil liberties as seen with the 
use of the US Patriot Act of 2001, which was 
intended as a counter-terrorism measure:           
When it was signed into law six weeks after 
the [9/11] attacks, the act made it easier 
to wiretap American citizens suspected of 
cooperating with terrorism, to snoop through 
business records without notification, and to 
execute search warrants without immediately 
informing their targets (a so-called sneak-and-
peek). Privileges once reserved for overseas 
intelligence work were extended to domestic 
criminal investigations. There was less 
judicial oversight and very little transparency. 
The bill’s symbolism mattered also, signalling 
that the moral deference previously given 
to the Special Forces would be broadened 
until it encompassed much of the apparatus 
of the American state. Local prosecutors, 
military policemen, CIA lawyers—these were 
indispensable patriots too.54
 
A decade after its introduction, the Patriot Act 
had been used in only fifteen terrorism cases 
but 1,618 drug cases. 55
One strategy used to push back on-line drug 
sales relates to the prosecution of postal 
services and courier firms, as seen in the 
fining of UPS and indictment of FedEx Corp for 
money laundering in relation to the delivery 
of medications without prescription from on-
line, clear web pharmacies, which, like the 
Dark Net hidden markets, have experienced 
exponential growth. This strategy, extending 
to surveillance and interception of private 
mail, encourages innovation in delivery 
methods56 and faces legal challenge from 
postal companies. According to the trade 
journal Post and Parcel in relation to the 
FedEx case, the shipping company was of 
the view that the lawsuit tests the concept 
of privacy within the business of shipping, 
placing on the carrier legal responsibility for 
the contents of packages being transported. 
As such, FedEx noted, 
We will plead not guilty […] We will continue 
to defend against this attack on the integrity 
of FedEx. We continue to ask for a list of all 
internet pharmacies engaging in illegal activity 
so we can turn off shipping for those companies 
immediately. We have asked for a list, and 
they have sent us indictments.” […] FedEx was 
ready to work with law enforcement to tackle 
the issue, but insisted “the responsibility to 
monitor, regulate or police the activities of 
doctors and pharmacists lies with licensing, 
regulatory and law enforcement authorities, 
not shipping companies.57
International and national level law 
enforcement acknowledge the capacity, 
logistical, technical and financial constraints 
they face in dealing with the hidden markets and 
the Dark Net more broadly. Recommendations 
to address these limitations typically focus 
on enhancing the skills, resource and legal 
base of counter narcotics actors and agencies, 
including through improvements to cross 
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border cooperation in intelligence sharing and 
interdiction operations. 
This recourse to conservative and traditional 
mainstream solutions severely underestimates 
the scale of the capacity building required. 
They are largely  unsophisticated in their 
proposals for the directing of (increasingly 
scarce) resources and, as discussed in this brief 
and as evidenced in other areas of the drug 
trade, strict enforcement efforts often only 
fragments and expands the hidden markets. As 
such a rigid law enforcement approach risks 
increasing harm rather than promoting the 
‘well-being of mankind’, a core objective of 
the UN treaty system as set out in the 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 
framework within which national legal systems 
operate. Additionally the focus on hidden drug 
markets detracts resources and capacity from 
‘industrial level’ criminality in relation to child 
sexual exploitation, as recently outlined by 
the UK Prime Minister.58        
An alternative approach to the challenge of 
the popular, expanding and dynamic hidden 
drug markets is one based on harm reduction 
principles, ‘market management’59 oriented 
evidence based approaches and a pragmatic 
response to dramatically changing internet 
technologies: 
1 There must be investment in ethical, 
well-funded research and analysis of the 
interactions of hidden drug markets, and 
vendor / user dynamics. This should address 
the extent to which review systems that 
reward sellers of ‘quality’ products reduce 
the risk associated with drug consumption; 
how hidden market operations impact 
violence associated with street dealing, 
and how far chat rooms and discussion 
forums - as open and anonymous spaces 
for discussion - provide an entry point for 
drug support services,60 particularly for 
users isolated from mainstream services 
due to problematic use or concerns over 
identification. 
2 The research of Aldridge and Décary-Hétu61 
among others demonstrates that the most 
frequently transacted drugs are moderate 
and organic substances such as cannabis 
(and niche drugs such as magic mushrooms 
and khat), not drugs associated with 
problematic use and chaotic lifestyles 
such as heroin or methamphetamine. More 
and better information about the types of 
drugs transacted on the rapidly increasing 
number of sites is required in order to 
prevent interventions that disrupt ‘soft’ 
supplies and drive vendors and buyers 
into deeper and ‘harder’ markets, and in 
order to better identify and support the 
needs of chaotic users who typically do not 
purchase from the Dark Net. Responses to 
the hidden markets must learn the lesson 
of previous enforcement errors, and avoid 
unsophisticated catch-all strategies.   
3 The diversification of drug sites has 
enabled users to make ethical choices 
about the sites where they will buy drugs. 
More research is required to substantiate 
emerging evidence that the online drug 
community reject marketplaces that 
also for example sell / exchange images 
of child sexual exploitation or weaponry. 
Law enforcement activities against what 
are in many respects self-regulating and 
‘ethical’ communities is counterproductive 
while conversely a virtual modus vivendi 
offers the opportunity for the exchange of 
information relating to high end criminal 
activities that many Dark Net drug 
enthusiasts deplore. Knowledge relating 
to internal hidden market communities, 
regulations and codes of conduct will 
support intelligence gathering as this 
relates to the most serious cyber-crimes, is 
in line with Europol’s need, acknowledged 
in the 2014 Internet Organised Crime 
Assessment to build ‘new alliances.’ 
4 Law enforcement should focus skills and 
resources on high level organised and 
predatory cyber-crime including child and 
female sexual exploitation, financial crime, 
weapons trafficking, cross border cyber-
attacks and cyber terrorism. As outlined 
in a Computers at Risk report by the US 
National Research Council from 1991 
‘Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do 
more with a keyboard than with a bomb.’62 
There consequently needs to be hierarchy 
of security risk when assessing cyber 
enforcement priorities, with non-violent 
and consensual drug transactions on the 
Dark Net relegated to the minor role that 
these activities play in the generation of 
illicit cyber revenues and social threat.  
5 The growth of hidden markets and the Dark 
Net more broadly evokes sensationalist 
statements and publicity from politicians, 
the media and law enforcement. Public 
opinion and policy responses must not 
be framed by panic and fear of emerging 
technologies. A primacy must be placed 
on information, explanation and evidence, 
particularly to bridge generational divides 
over technology literacy and use. 
6 It was opposition to the ‘war on drugs’ 
approach and to law enforcement dominated 
strategies applied to achieve a ‘drug free 
world’  - as, among other places, prominently 
laid out in the slogan for the 1998 UNGASS 
on the World Drug Problem - that brought 
civil libertarians and drug ‘enthusiasts’ 
together on the internet to develop the first 
online drug information exchanges, archives 
, databases and ultimately drug markets. It 
is the prohibition for recreational purposes 
of certain substances that makes their 
supply so lucrative and this underpins the 
growth surge enjoyed by Dark Net drug 
sites as internet and social media use has 
and will continue to expand rapidly. The 
2016 UNGASS offers a timely opportunity to 
begin to defuse the projected rate of Dark 
Net drug market growth.  In the short to 
medium term, the international community 
should consider creating policy space 
within which to manage better Dark Net 
drug markets rather than solely seeking to 
eliminate them and undermine the harm 
reduction benefits that they appear to offer. 
In relation to longer term goals, the rapid 
expansion and dynamic nature of these non-
traditional markets also adds to the already 
growing pressure for a re-evaluation of the 
current prohibition-oriented international 
framework and catalyses the need for 
serious discussion of a formal shift towards 
regulated markets for some currently illicit 
substances; a once heretical call that is 
now gaining traction.63          
It is acknowledged that hidden drug markets 
can introduce people to drugs that might 
otherwise not be accessible, that drugs bought 
on the internet can cause harm and that 
harm reduction benefits may not be equally 
distributed across states, regions and markets. 
Nevertheless, these real dangers and concerns 
are outweighed by the harms caused by current 
or any future strategies based on efforts to 
simply disrupt and dislocate Dark Net supply.        
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